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EDWARD GORDON*

Trends
American Courts, International
Law and "Political Questions"
Which Touch Foreign Relations
Most Americans regard as axiomatic the proposition that under the Constitution the people are the beneficiary of limitations imposed on the government, not the other way around. The rights of the people antedate the Constitution; the authority 'of the government, on the other hand, at least the
federal government, derives exclusively from the Constitution. However,
with respect to the authority to conduct foreign relations it appears to some
observers that the Constitution assumes rather than confers authority.' That
is, they say that the source of the federal government's authority to conduct
foreign affairs is not the Constitution, but is rather national sovereignty itself
and that its legal limits are those which are set by international law.' For example, when Justice Story referred to United States jurisdiction over conquered territories, he said it "would perhaps rather be a result from the whole
mass of the powers of the national government, and from the nature of
political society, than a consequence or incident of the powers specially enumerated [in the Constitution]." 3
As Professor Louis Henkin has pointed out,4 the fact that other independent nations possess a certain power may argue that the United States as an
entity has that power, but it does not of itself show that it belongs to the
federal government or, if so, which branch of it. The debates which preceded
adoption of the Constitution leave little doubt that the framers intended to
give the power to conduct foreign relations, as that power was then under*Professor of Law, Albany Law School, Union University.
'See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 19 (1972) (hereinafter HENKIN).
For a contrary set of views, see, e.g., Paust, The Unconstitutional Detention of Mexican and
Canadian Prisoners by the United States Government, 12 VAND J.TRANS. L. 67 (1979).
'But see The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603-604 (1889); and Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957).
12J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION 148 (5th ed. 1891), cited in HENKIN at 288n.
'HENKIN at 18.
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stood, to the federal government.' However, neither those debates nor the
text of the Constitution satisfactorily answers the question of how the federal
government's foreign relations power should be allocated among its three
branches. Increasingly, though not without exceptions, American courts
have tended to locate that power exclusively in the executive, except where the
Constitution expressly confers it upon Congress. Thus, in United States v.
Curtiss-WrightExport Corp.,' the Supreme Court could speak of "the very
delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the
federal government in the field of foreign relations."
It would seem to follow from Curtiss-Wright, which bases its assertion of
Presidential authority over foreign affairs on international custom, that the
President's power to conduct foreign relations is governed solely by international law, so far as American courts should be concerned. 7 But the courts
may no longer be in a position to effectively apply even this limited restraint
in the face of a series of confusing interpretations of the so-called "political
question" doctrine which is leading some judges to apply it in a way which
virtually excludes international law-at least customary international lawfrom the ranks of legitimate decisional determinants.
Thus, at a point in history when executive decisions are coming to have no
less an impact on private lives than public legislation and judicial pronouncements traditionally do, the checks on governmental excess which usually flow
from the principle of the separation of powers are being seriously eroded in
the name of that principle. Moreover, because any issue, otherwise justiciable, which "touches foreign relations" is apt to be dismissed by some courts
as a nonjusticiable political question on that ground alone, the availability of
a judicial remedy is becoming an uncertain thing in a wide range of disputes
whose resolution may have an impact on this country's foreign relations.

'It is beyond the scope of this article to question whether the concept of "a (or the) foreign
relations power" issufficiently precise for normative purposes when so much of the distinction
between domestic and foreign affairs has been blurred. Human interaction which two hundred
years ago might have seemed to be exclusively domestic now is increasingly perceived to involve
foreign implications as well. In this sense, especially, treating the government's "foreign relations" power as extraconstitutional has increasingly serious consequences for the role of judicial
review in constitutional government. Moreover, from a strictly historical point of view, one is
obliged to doubt that the founding fathers meant to extend the executive's foreign relations
authority so far beyond ordinary diplomatic intercourse as some recent construction of that
authority would do.
6299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
'As noted below, the Supreme Court, in deciding Curtiss-Wright, was not immediately concerned with the protection of individual rights, such as those which are addressed by the Bill of
Rights. Presumably, insofar as the Court since then has come to regard the Constitution primarily as a bulwark for the individual against governmental excess, the broad sweep of CurtissWright now may be said to admit of an exception or may be said to have been modified by later
cases. However, those who invoke Curtiss-Wright usually do so to vindicate nearly unfettered
executive branch authority in matters touching foreign relations and tend not to mention the
impact which later Supreme Court opinions implicitly make in its broad sweep. But see Paust,
supra note I and cases cited.
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Insofar as these results do obtain, the government may be said to have
become the beneficiary of constitutional limitations placed on the people.
That this may lead to distortions in American constitutional government is
what this installment of Trends is about.
The Legacy of Curtiss-Wright
"[W]here foreign affairs are concerned, the Constitution seems a strange,
laconic document," Professor Henkin writes.8 "Although it lodges important foreign affairs powers in one branch or another of the federal government, and denies important powers to the States, many others are not mentioned." 9 In fact, the power to conduct foreign relations is not mentioned, as
such, anywhere in the text of the Constitution. It is not delegated to the
federal government, at least not in so many words, nor is it specifically allocated to one or another branch of the federal government.
Congress is given the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, to
define and punish piracy and other offenses against the law of nations, and to
declare war, among those of its enumerated powers which have a bearing on
the conduct of foreign affairs. The President is accorded the power, inter
alia, to make treaties and to send and receive ambassadors; these, too, involve important aspects of the foreign relations process. But the sum of all
the unequivocally enumerated powers in the Constitution is less than even the
smallest fraction of what is actually involved in foreign relations. Thus,
Henkin asks rhetorically:
Where is the power to recognize other states or governments, to maintain or break
diplomatic relations, to open consulates elsewhere and permit them here, to acquire
or cede territory, to give or withhold foreign aid, to proclaim a Monroe Doctrine or
an Open-Door policy, indeed to determine all the attitudes and carry out all the
details in the myriads of relationships with other nations that are "the foreign
policy" and "the foreign relations" of the United States?'
These "missing" powers, says Henkin, and a host of similar ones were
clearly intended for and have always been exercised by the federal government," although the textual justification for this constitutional evolution has
sometimes been a subject of debate. In recent decades, this debate has been
overshadowed by that which concerns the proper allocation of the federal
government's foreign relations power among the three branches.
Executive branch pronouncements on the subject, almost by conditioned
response, assume or contend that the nature of.the broad powers specifically
granted to the President compels the inference of a wide range of implied
ones. One example that is offered is the President's power to appoint ambassadors to and receive them from a foreign state.2 Virtually from the outset of
'HENKIN

at 16.

91d.

IOld.

"Id.
at 17.
"U.S. CONST., Art.

11, §§ 2 and 3.
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the Republic, American courts have accepted the argument that in that enumerated power lies an implied power to determine the formal existence of
foreign states-i.e., to recognize them. 3 Extending this logic, courts have
also found lodged in the executive the power to fix (so far as this country is
concerned) the territorial boundaries of foreign states, for, it is reasoned, the
legal existence of a nation-state under international law has often depended,
inter alia, upon the attribution to it of certain territorial boundaries."
Frequently, foreign affairs powers have been inferred from general grants
of powers and from designations read as grants: for example, from
Congress's power to do what is "necessary and proper" to carry out other
powers,'" or from the provision vesting in the President "the executive
Power."'" As to the former, one may reasonably argue, as James Madison
did in his reply to Alexander Hamilton, after the latter had supported President Washington's power to proclaim neutrality in the war between France
and Great Britain," that Congress is the principal organ of government and
has all its political authority, in foreign affairs as elsewhere, except that
which is specifically delegated to the President alone or with the Senate."8
One might also say that under the Articles of Confederation the determination of foreign policy and the control of foreign relations lay with Congress
and, thus, except where it specifically changed the locus of these powers, the
Constitution left them where they were. Arguing for Presidential authority,
on the other hand, one could note that diplomacy by Congress was an unqualified failure under the Articles of Confederation and that those who met
in Philadelphia to revise the Articles had that failure uppermost in their
minds. Accordingly, one could read the designation of the President as the
"Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,"' 9 or the directive that "he
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," 2 or even more the
statement that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President"" as
"proof" of an intent to lodge plenary powers for the conduct of foreign
relations with the executive branch.
As to this last line of reasoning, one could draw critical significance from
the fact that while Article II of the Constitution speaks of "the executive

"See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Occidental of Umm
al Qaywayn v. A Certain Cargo, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978). Compare "X", Foreign Policy
and Judicial Discretion, 27 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 446 (1978).
"See, e.g., Art. I of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 49 Stat.
3097, T.I.A.S. No. 881. 165 L.N.T.S. 19.
"U.S. CONST., Art. 1, § 8.
"Id. Art 11,§ 1. E.g., Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415,420 (1839); Jones v.
United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890); Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
"See HENKIN at 298 note 12.
"Id. at 82-83.
"U.S. CONST., Art. 11,§ 2.
'"ld., § 3.
"Id., § 1.
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Power"-with the definite article "the"-Article I, speaking of Congress's
powers, refers to "all legislative Power herein granted,"2 2 thus supporting
the inference that Congress's powers are specifically enumerated while the
President's-within the context of powers granted to the federal government-are plenary. 23
There is probably not a lawyer encountering these constructions of the text
of the Constitution who could not drive a dialectical coach and four through
the holes in their logic. But the Supreme Court had found no better justification for one or another ascription of the power to conduct some aspect of
foreign relations for 150 years after the Constitution was adopted, until Justice George Sutherland, in his opinion for the Court in Curtiss-Wright,
held that the constitutional principles which apply with respect to domestic matters do not apply equally in foreign affairs.2 ' In Curtiss-Wright, a
Joint Resolution of Congress had authorized the President to embargo arms
to the countries at war in the Chaco, and imposed criminal penalties for
violating such an embargo. President Roosevelt proclaimed an embargo and
the defendant company, indicted for violating it, challenged the Resolution
and the Proclamation as entailing an improper delegation of legislative
power to the President. Sustaining the indictment, the Court held that the
principles which limit delegation of powers in domestic affairs do not apply
in foreign affairs. 5
That there are differences between the powers of the federal government in
respect of foreign or external affairs and those in respect of domestic or
internal ones may not be doubted, Justice Sutherland wrote.

"Id., Art. I, § 1. Emphasis added.
"A strict construction of the text of 1789 might lead to the conclusion that the unenumerated
powers pertaining to the conduct of foreign relations were reserved to the states. But the operative Constitution has for some time denied this interpretation.
"Henkin, at 288-89n, notes that Justice Sutherland had special interest and expertise in foreign relations. He had been United States Senator from Utah and a member of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and had delivered lectures published as Constitutional Powers and
World Affairs (1919). In 1909 he had written an article anticipating the distinction he pro-

pounded in Curtiss- Wright: THE

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POWERS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERN-

S. Doc. No. 417, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910). According to one writer, "a careful check
indicates that the whole theory [of Curtiss- Wright] and a great amount of its phraseology had
become engraved on Mr. Sutherland's mind before he joined the Court, waiting for the opportunity to be made the law of the land. The circumstances show that he had preformed opinions
on the subject and that when he spoke in the Curtiss-Wright decision, he did little to reexamine
his long cherished ideas." Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice
Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 478 (1946).
"Only Justice McReynolds dissented, with a one-sentence opinion. Justice Stone did not
participate in the case. Henkin observes: "One may wonder how his Curtiss-Wright theory
received almost unanimous concurrence in a Court so sharply riven by other fundamental constitutional differences. Of course, in foreign affairs, State's rights were not an issue and other
philosophical differences that divided the Court were also irrelevant. Individual rights had not
yet had their luxuriant growth and in any event, did not seem threatened by broad foreign affairs
powers. Perhaps, too, the divided Justices were content, even eager, to find one area of agreeMENT,

ment."

HENKIN

at 25n.
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The two classes of powers are different, both in respect of their origin and their
nature. The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers
except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers
as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs. 2"
As to the origin of these separate classes of power, Justice Sutherland argued
that with respect to the government's powers in domestic affairs, the primary
purpose of the Constitution was to carve from the general mass of legislative
powers then possessed by the states such portions as it was thought desirable
to vest in the federal government, leaving those not enumerated with the
states. But this applied only to the powers the states then had, he said,
whereas the states never possessed "international powers." During the colonial period these were possessed exclusively by the Crown. By the Declaration
of Independence they were transferred directly to the colonies "in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America." 7 Even before the Declaration, "the colonies were a unit in foreign affairs, acting
through a common agency-namely the Continental Congress." 2 8 Rulers
and governments and forms of government come and go, Justice Sutherland
wrote, but sovereignty survives: "A political society cannot endure without a
supreme will somewhere. Sovereignty is never held in suspense.'"29 When,
therefore, the external sovereignty of Great Britain over the colonies ceased,
it passed to the Union. In any event, so reasoned Justice Sutherland.
Where did Sutherland locate the source and limit of the government's
power in respect of foreign affairs? Not in the Constitution, but in international law, viz:
It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.
The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned
in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality ... As a member of the family of nations, the right and
power of the United States in that field are equal to the right and power of the other
members of the international family. Otherwise, the United States is not completely
sovereign. The power to acquire territory by discovery and occupation... , the
power to expel undesirable aliens .... the power to make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense .... none of which is
expressly affirmed by the Constitution, nevertheless exist as inherently inseparable
from the conception of nationality. This the court recognized, and . . . found the
warrant for its conclusions not in the provisions of the Constitution, but in the law
of nations.30
Not everyone has found Justice Sutherland's history lesson or his logic
persuasive." Professor Henkin, for instance, asks why, if there were to be
26299 U.S. at 315-316.

171d. at 316.
281d.

"Id. at 316-317.
1°Id. at 318.
"Henkin notes that "Justice Sutherland's theory has not been unanimously acclaimed. His
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principal powers of government outside the Constitution, that fact is not
intimated in the Constitution itself, in the records of the Constitutional Convention, or in the Federalist Papers and other contemporary debates. 2
Much of Justice Sutherland's opinion constitutes obiter dictum. He was not
looking for new power for the United States or for either the President or
Congress; he was seeking only to uphold a broad delegation of power by
Congress to the President. Thus, he needed to show only that, in this respect,
foreign affairs powers are different from domestic affairs powers. 33 Thus, all
that Curtiss-Wright really decides is that Congress may delegate its foreign
affairs powers to the President-a not unreasonable conclusion. The opinion
in which it is ensnared, on the other hand, seems unworthy of extended life.
Accordingly, while the decision itself is cited with approval to this day, restatements of it tend to avoid reference to its conceptual/historical underpinnings.3 '
The significance of Curtiss-Wright as a doctrine has been described by
Professor Henkin in rather stark terms:
It means that a panoply of important powers is to be determined from unwritten,
uncertain, changing concepts of international law and practice, developed and
growing outside the constitutional tradition and our particular heritage."

Yet, even Henkin's assessment pales beside the implications of the doctrine
one is apt to draw when Justice Sutherland's opinion is read in the light of
opinions like that recently delivered by Judge Lewis R. Morgan for the Fifth
Circuit in Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn v. A Certain Cargo," especially
the following passage from it:
In their external relations, sovereigns are bound by by no law; they are like our
ancestors before the recognition or imposition of the social contract. A prerequisite
of law is recognized superior authority whether delegated from below or imposed

from above-where there is no recognized authority there is no law. Because no law
exists binding these sovereigns and allocating rights and liabilities, no method exists
to judicially resolve their disagreements.,"
history, in particular, has been challenged, and surely it is not manifestly all his way: there is
disagreement whether the Declaration of Independence declared a single sovereign entity or
thirteen independent nation-states; there is evidence that, after independence, at least some of
the erstwhile colonies, at least for some time and for some purposes, considered themselves
sovereign, independent states; even under the Articles of Confederation it is not wholly clear that
'the United States' was a sovereign entity rather than a bank of sovereigns acting together
through the agency of the Congress." HENKIN at 23.
"Id. at 24.
"Id. at 25n.
'"Idat292n. Such, in fact, was the case as recently as last December, when Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Stevens, cited the case as authority for
the resolution of the issue before the Court in Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), a case
whose significance is taken up below.
"HENKIN at 25.
16577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978).
"Id. at 1204-1205. Occidentaldoes not necessarily follow from Justice Sutherland's reasoning
in Curtiss-Wright. In fact, it is in many respects unique, especially with regard to what it says
about international law. Nevertheless, it acts with Curtiss-Wright to undermine international
law's historic role in American courts.
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The "Political Question" Question:
Curtiss-Wright Revived and Compounded
The idea that the conduct of foreign relations lies exclusively within the
executive power did not spring to life with Justice Sutherland's opinion in
Curtiss-Wright.3 And, truth to tell, courts have not invariably clasped that
idea to their bosoms since then. 9 But it does appear to be enjoying a revival
of sorts, one in which, as the Occidental case itself suggests, the so-called
"political question" doctrine is playing a complicating role whose full implications are not yet well understood.
Occidental presented the court with conflicting claims to oil concession
rights in the Persian Gulf. Although the litigants themselves were private
corporations, their concessions were ultimately based on disputed claims of
two sovereign powers (Iran and Sharjah) to sovereignty over the concession
area. Noting that the area's sovereignty had long been the subject of dispute,
Judge Morgan wrote: "Were we to resolve this dispute we would not only
usurp the executive power, [we would also] intrude the judicial power beyond
its philosophical limits." 40
In support of this view, Judge Morgan cited the political question doctrine
and offered a brief, selective review of the development of that doctrine and
its current status. One need not concur in his interpretation to appreciate that
the ambiguity of the political question doctrine encourages judges to interpret it for themselves. In its simplest form, the political question doctrine
embodies the notion that certain issues are unsuited for judicial resolution
because their resolution entails discretionary choices that courts are institutionally less well equipped to make than other branches of government are.
Chief Justice Marshall appears to have been speaking of political questions in
this sense in Marbury v. Madison" when he wrote:
By the Constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain
important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion,
and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his own
conscience.
...[AInd whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive
discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that
discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights,
and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.
and
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to
enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a
38
Compare Justice Lamar's statement that in foreign relations "even the internal adjustment
of federal power, with its complex system of checks and balances, [is] unknown." In re Nagle,
135 U.S. 1, 85 (1890). See also HENKIN, passim, for examples of other instances in which the
executive's position in foreign relations has been held to be exclusive or nearly so.
"E.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1964).
4"577 F.2d at 1205.
5 U.S. (I Cranch.) 137, 165-66, 170 (1803).
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discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and
laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.
It is arguable that, as envisioned by Marshall, the demarcation of the political from the judicial domain principally concerns the impact which a decision may have on individual rights."' But Marbury v. Madison is also susceptible to the interpretation that the proper concern of the courts is only
whether the political branches of government have exceeded constitutional
limitations; that is, so long as they act within their constitutional powers,
whether they have done so wisely or well is a "political question" which is not
for the courts to consider. '
In any event, the case clearly establishes the principle that the acts of the
political branches of government are subject to judicial review and its corollary that such review does not, of itself, express a lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government. Judicial review having become one of
the keystones of American constitutional jurisprudence, the idea that some
issues lie beyond judicial scrutiny does not rest altogether comfortably with
American constitutional lawyers. Thus Henkin, although he is generally sympathetic to an expansive interpretation of the executive's powers in the field
of foreign relations, nonetheless observes that "a doctrine that finds some
issues exempt from judicial review cries for such strict and skeptical
scrutiny."" Such scrutiny has not always been forthcoming, however, and
Henkin is moved to conclude that what is called the political question doctrine is "an unnecessary, deceptive packaging of several established doctrines
that has misled lawyers and courts to find in it things that were never put there
4
and make it far more than the sum of its parts.'"
It is beyond the scope of the present article to list or comment upon the
several established doctrines to which Professor Henkin refers. For present
purposes, it is enough to recall that it has long been a subject of debate among
constitutional scholars whether the political question doctrine, whatever its
content, is a matter of deference and self-restraint or one of constitutional
compulsion, that is, in the sense of an implied limitation upon "the Judicial
power." In 1959, this debate became more intense with the publication in the
HarvardLaw Review of a provocative article by Professor Herbert Wechsler." In relevant part, Wechsler wrote that the political question doctrine
involves the courts in an act of constitutional interpretation, to be made and
judged by standards that should govern the interpretative process generally.
That, he submitted, is totally different from a broad discretion to abstain or
7
intervene.'

4'Henkin,

Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 600 (1976).

"Id. at 598.
"Id. at 600.
"Id. at 622.

"Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
"Id. at 9.

306

INTERNATIONAL LA WYER

Wechsler's position was quickly challenged by Professor Alexander M.
Bickel, in another HarvardLaw Review article"8 in which Bickel wrote:
Such is the basis of the political-question doctrine: the court's sense of lack of
capacity, compounded in unequal parts of the strangeness of the issue and the
suspicion that it will have to yield more often and more substantially to expediency
than to principle; the sheer momentousness of it, which unbalances judgment and
prevents one from subsuming the normal calculations of probabilities; the anxiety
not so much that judicial judgment will be ignored as that perhaps it should be but
won't; finally and in sum ....

the inner vulnerability of an institution which is

electorally irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from. 9
Bickel concluded that the political question doctrine is not really a matter of
constitutional interpretation, it is "something more flexible, something of
prudence, not construction and not principle."" 0
Wechsler's viewpoint, rather than Bickel's, appears at first reading to have
had the better of it insofar as persuading the Supreme Court is concerned,
judging by the Court's decision, in 1962, in Baker v. Carr.5 Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, therein undertook an extensive survey of the history
and evolution of the political question doctrine and identified in the cases he
reviewed certain characteristics or considerations whose inextricable presence in a case rendered the case nonjusticiable and therefore not a "case or
52
controversy" under Article III of the Constitution. These factors are worth
recounting here, since several of them, read together, have begun to have the
effect of disengaging international law, especially customary international
law, from the judicial process by defining these time-honored sources of laws
as "political questions":
(1) a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department
(2) lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards

"Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv.
40 (1961).
"Id. at 46.
"0Id. at 75.
'369 U.S. 186 (1962).
"Baker involved a challenge to the legality of a reapportionment of voting districts in Illinois.
Its holding repudiates the Court's holding, on very similar facts, in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549 (1946), and the entire historical and logical analysis of the political question doctrine which
Justice Frankfurter adduced in support of his opinion for the Court in Colegrove. Justice
Frankfurter was still on the bench when Baker was decided-indeed, although he modified his
own position somewhat, he dissented from the new majority's. Seeking to explain that Colegrove represented an aberration from the mainstream of political question decisions by the
Court, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, undertook his extensive-though by no means
uniformly thorough-survey of the history of the political question doctrine. Although foreign
relations were in no way involved in the dispute before the Court, Justice Brennan cited cases
pertaining to the conduct of foreign relations as indicative of the presence in political question
cases of certain recurring considerations, infra. In recent years, virtually all of the members of
the Court offering views on the application of the political question doctrine to issues touching
the conduct of foreign relations have referred to Justice Brennan's survey in Baker as authoritative; but none seems disposed to recall that with respect to such issues his survey was highly
abbreviated, more than a little selective, and, just possibly, mistaken.
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(3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind

clearly for nonjudicial discretion
(4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches of government
(5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made
(6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question"3
Where the issues before a court touch the conduct of foreign relations in
some way or another, as issues in so many cases having transnational elements or consequences do today, it is difficult to see how they can avoid
triggering one or more of these verbal devices. Indeed, taken at face valuethat is, without the judicial discretion which their enunciation was apparently
designed to obviate-they seem to write the judicial process out of the settlement of a wide range of contemporary disputes which are, except in this
regard, eminently justiciable.
Moreover, contrary to what Justice Brennan (and Professor Wechsler)
may have had in mind, the tests Baker v. Carr establishes, or restates, do not
eliminate the influence of personal judicial bias from the determination that a
political question is present. What they do is to shift the focus of that bias
to-or cause it to be rationalized in terms of-six verbal formulae so broad
that, if anything, self-restraint is required to avoid their sweep. In the
process, the subjective factor is concealed, not eliminated. Indeed, one reason the Occidental decision is worth special attention is that it inadvertently
reveals just how critical a role subjective factors continue to play in political
question cases. Another is that it illustrates how judicial bias against international law itself can utilize Baker v. Carr to justify the displacement of international law from the ranks of legitimate decisional determinants.
In Occidental, Judge Morgan found every one of the factors Justice Brennan had adduced in Baker present in the case before him. Accordingly, he
declared the case to be nonjusticiable, adding: "[Tihe vitality of the political
question [doctrine] in the arena of foreign relations is abundantly demonstrated. "3' Whether or not one agrees that the issues in the case were unsuited
for judicial determination, one is bound to be troubled by the implications of
some of the reasons the court advanced for its conclusion. For example, one
of the issues on which the rival claims to sovereignty turned was the seaward
limit of the disputed island's territorial waters. 5 Acknowledging that this
was a subject upon which international law might have some bearing, Judge
Morgan nonetheless observed:

"1369 U.S. at 217.
11577 F.2d at 1203. The case might well have been decided without reference to the political
question doctrine or by making a distinction between that doctrine and a specific constitutional
construction.
"The concession area included submerged land lying off the coast of the island.
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Although some standards have been developed for the delineation of territorial
waters, these formulations leave unresolved the permissible seward extent of territorial waters. Therefore, we would be in a judicial no-man's land were we to purport
to decide the legality of Sharjah's unilateral extension of its territorial waters or
Iran's twelve-mile limit. 56
In fact, the opposite is the case. While ascertainment and application of the
relevant norms might not have been an easy task, it would hardly have taken
the court outside the traditional bounds of legitimate judicial inquiry. The
legal effect of a unilateral assertion of extended jurisdiction, though less than
unambiguous, is not ordinarily regarded as one of international law's most
recondite subjects. One is likewise reluctant to concede to the court that
appraising the legal effect of Iran's assertion of a twelve-mile territorial sea in
the Persian Gulf is a task which by its very nature lies beyond the realm of
proper judicial competence. The court may well have been sailing in troubled
waters, but it was nowhere in sight of a judicial no-man's land.
The same may be said of another issue which occasioned the court's finding of a political question. In this instance the issue was how the question of
ownership of the disputed concession was affected by international title to
the continental shelf between the disputed island and a nearby one over which
Sharjah had established sovereignty. On this point, the court said:
Again, although some standards have been developed, these standards depend in
part on the existence of agreement among sovereigns. Because ownership of the
continental shelf is derivative of the ownership of the unsubmerged land, the extent
and ownership of [the second island's] shelf is necessarily in dispute. No manageable law exists to resolve disputed continental shelf ownership, however. The nexus
between the absence of manageable standards and the political question [doctrine]
is quite evident. Resolution of disputed continental shelf can only occur by the
political action of the sovereigns themselves.'
One wonders why a court which is so wary of relatively finite questions of
international law is nonetheless so readily disposed to comment offhandedly
on a question as weighty as the role of sovereign consent in the creation of
contemporary rules and legal regimes under international law. For present
purposes, however, what is even more striking about the foregoing excerpt is
the court's interpretation of the phrase "manageable standards" as a synonym for "easily discoverable or applicable standards," for, unless such was
the meaning the court was ascribing to that phrase, how does one justify its
5
treating such sources of norms as the Convention on the Continental Shelf "
and the International Court of Justice's judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case 9 as non-manageable standards? In light of Occidental, to the
extent its reasoning is persuasive to other courts, it is difficult to imagine what
sources, and which norms, of customary international law will qualify as fit
for judicial consumption in American courts.
F.2d at 1205. Citations omitted.
"Id. Emphasis added.
11499 U.N.T.S. 311; T.I.A.S. 5578; see 52 AM. J.
36577

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

"9[19691 l.C.J. 3.

740-932.
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L. 858 (1958), and 4 WHITEMAN,
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There is nothing in the text of the Constitution or in its development by the
courts prior to Baker v. Carr to suggest that international law should be
excluded from judicial consideration where discovery of applicable rules or
principles involves judicial inquiry into sources with which the judges are not
altogether familiar or thoroughly comfortable. The judicial power extends to
"all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of
the United States and Treaties made-or which shall be made under their
authority." ' It also extends to cases involving ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, to controversies to which the United States is a party,
and to controversies between a state or citizen thereof and foreign states,
citizens and subjects." ' Thus, that the law of nations, although mentioned
specifically in the Constitution only in connection with Congress's power to
define and punish certain international offenses has been an essential part of
the law of the land from the earliest moments of the Republic has never been
doubted. In Hilton v. Guyot,6 2 the Supreme Court said:
International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense ...is part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice, as often as such
questions are presented in litigation between man and man, duly submitted to their
determination.
Nowhere in the judicial history of this country does one encounter the basis
for the proposition, which underlies interpretations such as Judge Lewis',
that the courts are absolved from responsibility for deciding an otherwise
justiciable issue merely because the applicable law is difficult to discover or
"manage". Such a policy would have severely hampered the growth of the
common law.
It is possible to construct an argument that, to the extent the Constitution is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the circumstances in which international
law is part of the law which American courts are bound to apply, the courts
themselves ought to be reluctant to apply it. To hold otherwise, such an
argument might run, is to infer judicial powers on the basis of historical (or
contemporaneous) analogies alone, or merely because of policy preferences.
Such an argument has not seriously been made, so far as this writer is aware,
probably because it would defy historical evidence that the application of
international law in American courts was accepted as appropriate by courts
and legal scholars from the outset-indeed, even before the Constitution and
simultaneously with its adoption. 63 In fact, is is really only in the past two
decades that doubt has been cast on the propriety of judicial invocation of
international legal norms; at that, the doubt has been cast indirectly, without

"°U.S. CONST.,

11d..
62159 U.S.

Art. 11,

§ 2.

113, 163 (1895). See also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). Cited,
with other historical references of like import, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 at 451-53 (1964) (White, J., dissenting).
"See generally Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United
States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26 (1952).
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a challenge to Hilton v. Guyot itself or the dozens of cases which have left
intact its unambiguous affirmation of international law's place in American
courts. 64
The tone of Judge Morgan's opinion is such as to support the explanation
that some judges regard international law as inherently "political," or at
least inherently different from law as they understand it. This attitude may
benefit from the tendency to define or perceive of international law solely or
mostly in terms of rules governing the conduct of nations interse. So long as
this perception obtains and international law is seen to be merely an extension
of ordinary diplomacy, undue importance is likely to continue to be attached
to well-publicized instances of indifference to legal restraints such as that
which characterizes the attitudes of many foreign offices at moments of extreme stress in their country's international relations. The effect is to overshadow the routine acceptance and observance of international legal norms
and processes by those very same governments under ordinary circumstances. Moreover, it tends to obscure the prevalence throughout the world
of an ongoing interaction between international legal norms and processes
and nationally-based ones, and the important impact international law has
thus come to have upon individual rights and obligations. Most of all,
perhaps, the tendency to think of international law primarily in terms of its
sporadic (and usually unflattering) appearance on the front pages of newspapers has the effect of concealing the price which nations pay for disregarding
international law, a price which often does not become clear until well after
the publicity subsides and the impact of the reciprocity of international legal
rights takes effect. It is a chronic failing of the international legal process that
its lack of centralized authority gives the impression, at critical moments,
that it is totally without effective sanctions, a false impression which unfortunately is likely to encourage any predisposition to regard international law as
something other than law strictu sensu."
The currency of such predispositions may owe some of its strength to the
lingering impact of Austinian jurisprudence, such as is indicated by Judge
Morgan's comment, supra that "a prerequisite of law is a recognized superior authority." If one accepts that premise, one is not venturing too far
afield in adding that, because national sovereigns are not beholden to an
"See Tipson, From InternationalLaw to World Public Order: Who Studies What, How,
Why, 4 YALE STUDIES INWORLD PUBLIC ORDER 39 (1977); Falk, A New Paradigmfor International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposals, 84 YALE L.J. 969 (1975); W. FRIEDMANN, THE
CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965); and R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963).

"Professor Richard A. Falk has argued persuasively that the relative absence of central
authorities in the international legal process dictates a greater, not lesser, role in its development
on the part of national courts of law. See R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL ORDER (1964). It has long been a characteristic of international law that what
eventually become its universally applicable norms are often introduced by national authorities-judicial, legislative and executive, e.g., the Supreme Court's decision, in 1820, on piracy;
the numerous national war claims acts; and President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation in
1793.
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immediately superior sovereign authority, universely recognized as such, international law is not truly law. This is not the place to rehearse the fallacies
of Austinian jurisprudence, or the cultural ethnocentricity which underlies
them. One merely notes that it at least exaggerates any tendency-and permits one to rationalize any personal disposition-to treat international law as
different from the "ordinary" law which courts are supposed to apply.
However, one cannot altogether discount the possibility that some judicial
uneasiness with international law grows out of the judges' uncertainty about
the sources of it and unfamiliarity with the means of researching it. Although
one would have thought these burdens eased somewhat by Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, which sets forth the sources of
international law which the ICJ is directed to apply, 66 the reference therein to
sources of international law which are somewhat different from what judges
might regard as appropriate sources of American law (of the completely
home-grown variety) may only enhance the problem.
A strong case can be made for the proposition that the latent motivation
for treating international law, or at least customary international law, as a
political question is the belief that the application of international law places
a judge in conflicting roles: that is, a conflict may be seen to exist between a
judge's role as a public servant of a national legal system which is predominantly self-contained, on the one hand, and as an officer (at least symbolically) of a legal system whose culture is inherently global, on the other. The
feeling of conflict may be especially acute when it is the United States government whose actions are challenged as violative of international community
standards, or when a challenge to some other government's actions requires a
ruling which may also draw into question some analogous conduct or course
of action by the United States government. In theory, at least since Marbury
v. Madison, the possibility that, from time to time, American courts may
have to find the actions of the government unlawful would seem to be a
fundamental precept of constitutional government built upon a separation of
powers. It may not be terribly efficient, from an executive point of view, but
efficiency is not the overriding concern of the principle of separation of governmental powers. In practice, however, principles of efficiency seem to reas-

""The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes
as are submitted to it, shall applya. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly
recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Art. 59 [i.e., that the Court's judgments are binding only on
the parties and in respect of the particular case], judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law."
I have suggested elsewhere that although these sources may be suitable to the work of the Court,
they should not be regarded as the last word on the subject. See Gordon, Acquiring International
Legal Materials: Some Things to Bear in Mind, 72 L. Lin. J. 476, 479 (1979).
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sert themselves when a court is asked to declare, directly or by inference, that
the government's actions violate international rules. That seems implicit in
the last four of the criteria Baker v. Carr adduces and may in any event
underlie a perception by some judges that their role as national judges sometimes conflicts with the role they are being asked to perform for international
law.
Some judges may also feel that their imposition of legal rules developed for
the most part outside the United States, or dependent for the authority they
communicate on an authoritative consensus among non-Americans, is inconsistent with the social contract. This notion, too, would have stifled the
growth of the common law. Moreover, it smacks of a deeper xenophobia
which seems particularly inappropriate among the judiciary.
It is worth recalling, in light of cases like Occidental, that in Baker v. Carr
the Supreme Court cautioned that "it is error to suppose that every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." 67 The Court itself was reminded of that dictum, two years after
Baker was decided, by Justice White in his dissent in Banco NacionaldeCuba
v. Sabbatino.68 Sabbatino ostensibly involved the Act of State doctrine,
which holds that the courts of one country will ordinarily not inquire into the
validity of an act of a foreign government within its sovereign territory. The
question before the Court in Sabbatino was whether Cuba's nationalization
of certain American-owned property violated international law. The Act of
State doctrine, it was told, rests upon the deference one sovereign pays to
another, as a matter either of comity or international law. In either case, the
argument ran, it was inappropriate to invoke the doctrine so as to give effect
extraterritorially to an act of the Cuban government which itself violated
international legal standards. In particular, the Court was urged not to give
effect to the transfer of title which the allegedly unlawful nationalizations
purported to bring about. The Court ruled that the issue was nonjusticiable.
Nowhere in Sabbatino does Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, mention the political question doctrine as such, an omission one must assume was
deliberate (since Harlan's opinion is replete with references to Baker v. Carr),
although it is not altogether clear what importance one should therefore
attach to it. The bulk of the Court's opinion in Sabbatino-somenineteen
separate references in all-is given over to showing why any ruling by the
Court on the issue before it could embarrass the executive in its conduct of
foreign relations. Baker is cited repeatedly as a source for the relevance of this
consideration, as well as for the conclusion by the Court, in light of disparities it found to exist in national practices relating to the taking of alien-owned
property, that resolution of the question of whether Cuba's nationalization
violated international law would entail a decision for which there was a lack

'1369 U.S. at 211.
68376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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of judicially discoverable and manageable standards, and a need for an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.
In context, and notwithstanding that Sabbatino was decided on, an interpretation of Act of State, not the political question doctrine, the Court's
treatment of the question before it left in doubt how seriously it was disposed
to follow its own counsel, in Baker, that courts should not suppose that every
issue which touches the conduct of foreign relations is automatically nonjusticiable as a political question.69 Even more, Sabbatino has led to Occidental
in finding in the relative ambiguity of customary international law evidence
of a political question. So unsettling did Justice White find this approach that
in the opening words of his dissent he wrote:
I am dismayed that the Court has, with one broad stroke, declared the ascertainment and application of international law beyond the competence of the courts of
the United States in a large and important category of cases."0
The Impact of Goldwater v. Carter
In view of interpretations of the Baker v. Carr standards such as that of the
Supreme Court in Sabbatino and that of the Fifth Circuit in Occidental, there
is reason for international lawyers to give extra attention to several opinions
offered by the Justices in support of the Supreme Court's ruling last December that Senator Goldwater's challenge to President Carter's assertion of a
right to unilaterally terminate this country's mutual defense treaty with
Taiwan without Senate authorization presented the Court with a nonjusticiable political question." The President had taken the action in conjunction
with the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, a circumstance which Justice Brennan, dissenting, felt
brought the action squarely within the ambit of the President's constitutional
authority, supra, to recognize and withdraw recognition from foreign governments. 72
A plurality of four justices, concurring in the Court's decision to vacate the
judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the district court
with instructions to dismiss, said it presented a political question and was
therefore nonjusticiable. Writing for the four, Justice Rehnquist said that
such a conclusion followed a fortiori from earlier political question cases.
The Constitution is express as to the manner in which the Senate shall participate in the ratification of a treaty, he said, but is silent as to its participation in
the termination of a treaty. "In the absence of any constitutional provision

"Id. at 439 (White, J.,dissenting).
"O0d.
1'444 U.S. 996 (1979).
'444 U.S. at 1006. Recognition of foreign governments and recognition of foreign states may
be distinguished conceptually; however, the President's power to do either appears to flow from
the same constitutional source and does not appear to be affected by the distinction.
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governing the termination of a treaty, and the fact that different termination
procedures may be appropriate for different treaties .. the instant case...
'must surely be controlled by political standards.'
Justice Powell, who also concurred in the judgment, would have dismiss "d
Senator Goldwater's suit as not ripe for judicial review.' But most of his
concurring opinion is directed at Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of the
political question doctrine, an interpretation Justice Powell found inconsistent with prior Court decisions. "As set forth in Baker v. Carr, the doctrine
incorporates three inquiries," Powell said, listing them as follows:
(i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the
Constitution to a coordinate branch of government?
(ii) Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of
judicial expertise?
(iii) Do prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?"5
Having thus reduced Baker v. Carr's six factors to three, Justice Powell
concluded that the answer to the three inquiries would require the Court to
decide Senator Goldwater's suit, if it were ripe for review. He said the first
inquiry was resolved by an examination of the constitutional provisions governing treaty termination; these suggested to him something less than an
unquestionable commitment of that power to the President. As to the second
inquiry, he said that resolution of the question which the suit raised would
not be easy, but "it only requires us to apply normal principles of interpretation to the constitutional provisions at issue."' 6 It would not involve a review
of the President's activities as Commander-in-Chief nor an impermissible
interference in the field of foreign affairs, he said, contrasting it to what
would be involved if the Court were asked to decide, say, whether a treaty
required the President to order troops into a foreign country. Recalling
Baker's dictum that it was error to suppose that every case or controversy
which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance, he added:
"This case 'touches' foreign relations, but the question presented to us concerns only the constitutional division of power between Congress and the
President.""
,

""

"444 U.S. at 1003, quotingfrom Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1302 (N.D. I11.
1975) (threejudge court).
'"'Prudential considerations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and the President
is not ready for judicial review unless and until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional authority. Differences between the President and the Congress are commonplace under
our system. The differences should, and almost invariably do, turn on political rather than legal
considerations. The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power
between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse.
Otherwise, we would encourage small groups or even individual Members of Congress to seek
judicial resolution of issues before the normal political process has the opportunity to resolve the
conflict." 444 U.S. at 997.
"Id. at 998. Citations omitted.
"Id. at 999.
77Id.
"A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I find inherent in Mr. Justice
Rehnquist's concurring opinion. Assume that the President signed a mutual defense treaty
with a foreign country and announced that it would go into effect despite its rejection by the
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Relating the third inquiry he had distilled from Baker v. Carr to the three
prudential factors listed in it, Justice Powell said that none of these prudential considerations would be present if the case were ripe for judicial review.
"Interpretation of the Constitution does not imply lack of respect for a coordinate branch," he wrote." Speaking specifically to the possibility of multiple constitutional interpretations of the Constitution, he noted that if the two
political branches had in fact reached irreconcilable positions, "final disposition of the question . . . would eliminate, rather than create," multiple interpretations. 9 "The spectre of the Federal Government brought to a halt
because of the multiple intransigence of the President and the Congress
would require this Court to provide a resolution pursuant to our duty 'to say
what the law is.' '80
The harshest criticism of the plurality's construction of the political question doctrine came from Justice Brennan, the author, it will be recalled, of
the Court's opinion in Baker. The plurality's construction "profoundly misapprehends the political question principle as it applies to foreign relations," 8 ' Brennan wrote. "Properly understood, the political question doctrine restrains courts from reviewing an exercise of foreign policy judgment
by the coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment
has been 'constitutional[ly] commit[ted].' "82 But the doctrine does not pertain, "when a court is faced with the antecedent question whether a particular
branch has been constitutionally designated as the repository of political
decisionmaking power." 83 That antecedent issue, he said, "must be resolved
as a matter of constitutional law, not political discretion; accordingly, it falls
within the competence of the courts." 8
What is clear from the divergency of interpretations of the political question doctrine which Goldwater v. Carter reflects is, first, that lower court
judges are free to interpret it as they wish, safe in the knowledge that their
construction of it is unlikely to conflict with a clear holding by the Supreme
Court; and second, that there is little likelihood in the immediate future that
the Court itself will undo the harm to international law which its judgments
Senate. Under Mr. Justice Rehnquist's analysis that situation would present a political question even though Art. II, § 2, clearly would resolve the dispute. Although the answer to the
hypothetical case seems self-evident because it demands textual rather than interstitial analysis, the nature of the legal issue presented is no different from the issue presented in the case
before us. In both cases the Court would interpret the Constitution to decide whether congressional approval is necessary to give a Presidential decision on the validity of a treaty the force
of law. Such an inquiry demands no special competence or information beyond the reach of
the judiciary." Id. at 999-1000.
"Id. at 1001.
"Id.
"Id., citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974), quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 177 (1803).
11444 U.S. at 1006.
Id. quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217.
Id. at 1007, citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519-521 (1969).
"4444 U.S. at 1007. Justice Blackmun and White were of the opinion that the Court should not
pass judgment on the justiciability issue until that issue had been briefed and argued orally.
2
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in Baker and Sabbatino caused. Moreover, as the following remarkable story

demonstrates, the confusion which reigns in the courts, and the abdication
therefore by the courts of their traditional role in checking the abuses of the
executive in its conduct of foreign relations, are not entirely lost on the executive branch. It is surely overstating the case to suggest that by virtue of that
abdication the courts have encouraged the executive to regard itself as unbound by legal constraints in its conduct of foreign relations. But it may not
be going too far to suggest that there is already a tendency in that direction.
A Judgment in Berlin
In Occidental, Judge Morgan suggested that claimants dismissed from a

judicial remedy because of executive prerogative might be accommodated
through executive intervention in the form of administrative courts to handle
all political cases, review by the Supreme Court to be limited to determining
the existence of a political question.8" He cautioned, however, that "because
the president holds plenary power in foreign relations ....
the president is
free to refuse [to intervene in any way]. Should the president ever officially
act on a political issue, we would be constitutionally bound to accept his

act." 8 6
If that prospect were not otherwise chilling to counsel for a claimant unable to obtain a judicial remedy because his claim touches foreign relations,
then knowing the circumstances attending a trial held by a specially constituted United Strates court in Berlin last spring is certainly apt to make it so.
The case, United States v. Tiede,8" was a criminal proceeding arising out of
the alleged diversion of a Polish aircraft by two East Germans from its scheduled landing in East Berlin to a forced landing in West Berlin. United States
authorities exercised jurisdiction over the matter and convened a court, acting under the authority of a law promulgated in 1955 by the former United
States High Commissioner for Germany.88
S'577

F.2d at 1205n.

961d.

"United States Court for Berlin, Criminal Case No. 78-001 and Criminal Case No. 78-001A
(1979).

"Berlin is an occupied city. On September 12, 1944, the United States, United Kingdom and
Soviet Union, exercising their anticipated rights of conquest, agreed on a joint occupation of
Berlin. A protocol on zones of occupation divided the city into separate sectors, each to be
occupied by one of the Allied Powers. In addition, an "inter-Allied Governing Authority"
(Kommandaturain Russian) was established to direct jointly the administration of the city. That
Kommandatura came into existence on July 11, 1945, when U.S., U.K. and French armed forces
moved into the city, which had initially been taken by Soviet forces. The Soviet Union purported
to withdraw from the Kommandatura in 1948, but the Western allies continue to govern their
sectors pursuant to legislation each is authorized to promulgate. On April 28, 1955, only a few
days before the occupation regime terminated for the rest of Germany, the U.S. High Commissioner promulgated Law No. 46 establishing the "United States Court for Berlin." The law
defines the jurisdiction of the court, sets forth the applicable substantive law and provides for the
appointment of judges and other principal court personnel by the United States Ambassador to
the Federal Republic of Germany. An extensive account and analysis of the history of the
occupation of Berlin, the jurisdictional basis of the United States Court for Berlin, and the
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Following the landing, which occurred on August 30, 1978, defendants
Hans Detlef Alexander Tiede and Ingrid Ruske, togther with Mrs. Ruske's
twelve-year-old daughter, were detained by United States military authorities
at a U.S. Air Force installation at Tempelhof. On November 1, 1978, the
United States Mission in Berlin advised the German authorities in West
Berlin that it would exercise jurisdiction over the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed in connection with the diversion of the Polish
airliner.8 9 Mrs. Ruske was released from detention on November 3; her
daughter had been released several weeks earlier. During the period of their
imprisonment, no charges had been brought against them.
On November 30, 1978, Dudley B. Bonsal, Senior United States District
Judge (and former Chief Judge) of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, was sworn in as "United States Judge for
Berlin." Judge Bonsai limited his function to the promulgation of rules of
criminal procedure to govern the bringing of charges, pretrial proceedings,
and trials in the court.9" He was succeeded, on December 6, 1978, by Leo M.
Goodman, former Judge of the United States Court of the Allied High Commission for Germany, and at the time of the trial the United States Member
on the Supreme Restitution Court, Germany.
On that date a complaint, supported by an affidavit executed by a U.S. Air
Force investigating officer, was filed against defendant Tiede. 9' Based on the
limitations on the American authorities who govern the 1.2 million people who reside in the
American sector of Berlin appear in the court's ruling, infra, on the applicability of the United
States Constitution to the instant proceedings. The ruling will be published in FEDERAL RULES
DECISIONS (West Publishing Company) and INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS (American Society of International Law).
"Jurisdiction was exercised pursuant to Article 7 and 10 of Allied Kommandatura Berlin Law
No. 7 of March 17, 1950, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
ARTICLE 7
1. The appropriate Sector Commandant may ... withdraw from a German Court, any proceeding directly affecting any of the persons or matters within the purview of paragraph 2 of
the Statement of Principles governing the relationship between the Allied Kommandatura and
Greater Berlin.
ARTICLE 10
The appropriate Sector Commandant may take such measures as he may deem necessary to
provide for the determination of cases which under this Law will not be within the jurisdiction
of
the German Courts.
0
9 Although the court was established in 1955, the Tiede case marked the first time in its twentyfour year history that it had been convened. Art. 3(5) of Law No. 46 confers the power "to
establish consistently with the applicable legislation the rules of practice and proceedings" for
the court. Pursuant to that authority, Judge Bonsai promulgated as Rules of Criminal Procedure

for the court a set of rules which, with one exception, adopted almost verbatim the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence. The exception related to jury trials.
Thus, under the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the court, the defendants in the Tiede case were
not entitled to a trial by jury. See Opinion of Herbert J. Stern, United States Judge for Berlin, in
United States v. Tiede, supra (hereinafter "Judge Stern's Opinion"), at 19.
"The complaint read in pertinent part:
That on or about 30 August, 1978, Hans Detlef Alexander Tiede did, by means of forced
threats and a weapon, that is a pistol, take a hostage, and divert Polish LOT Flight No. 165
from its scheduled route of Gdansk, Poland to Schoenfeld Airport [in East Berlin] and force
it to land at Tempelhof Central Airport in [West] Berlin.
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complaint, Judge Goodman issued a warrant for the arrest of Tiede; the
warrant was executed the same day and Tiede was brought before Judge
Goodman who advised him of his rights under the United States Constitution
and explained to him the nature of the criminal complaint filed against him.
In view of Tiede's indigency, Judge Goodman assigned a member of the
Berlin criminal bar as his counsel. 92 Following Tiede's presentment, and
upon the defendant's request, Judge Goodman scheduled a preliminary
hearing and arraignment for mid-January.
Also on December 6, a complaint with supporting affidavit was filed
against Mrs. Ruske, on the basis of which Judge Goodman caused a summons to be issued, commanding her to appear before the court in midJanuary for presentation and arraignment. German defense counsel was appointed by Judge Goodman for Mrs. Ruske in late December.93
On January 11, 1979, Herbert J. Stern, United States District Court Judge
for the District of New Jersey, was appointed by Ambassador Walter S.
Stoessel, Jr., to sit as United States Judge for Berlin in the case. The defendants were arraigned the next day. Prior to arraignment, Judge Stern appointed American counsel for both defendants" because the proceedings
would be conducted under American procedural law, although German substantive law would apply.
Defendants filed a timely motion demanding a jury trial, thereby challenging the court's rules9" and precipitating a constitutional challenge to the rules
which was to become the basis for a recurring series of dramatic exchanges
between the judge and the prosecuting attorneys,9" an exchange which, in its
entirety, deserves to find its way into standard casebooks and textbooks on
American constitutional law.
The prosecution took the position that the Constitution did not apply to
the proceedings because Berlin is a territory governed by military conquest. 9 '
It maintained that the question whether constitutional rights must be afforded in territories governed by United States authorities outside the United
States depends on the nature and degree of association between such territories and the United States, and that the relationship between the United States
and Berlin was such that the Constitution does not apply to proceedings in
Berlin.9" Thus, in its memorandum in opposition to defendants' motion, it
"ILe., Dietrich Herrmann, Esq.
" Le., Dr. Ulrich E. Biel, of the Berlin Bar.
"Appearing for defendant Tiede were Judah Best, Esq., and Kenneth L. Adams, Esq., of the
District of Columbia Bar. Appearing for defendant Ruske were Bernard Hellring, Esq., and
Richard D. Shapiro, Esq., of the New Jersey Bar.
"See note 90, supra.
"Appearing for the prosecution were Andre M. Surena, Esq., Legal Advisor, United States
Mission, Berlin (as United States Attorney for Berlin); Roger M. Adelman, Assistant United
States Attorney for the District of Columbia (as Special Prosecutor for Berlin); and two Berlin
Justice Ministry attorneys (as Assistant Prosecuting Officers).
"See Judge Stern's Opinion, at 19.
9$1d.
"Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion Regarding the Application of the Constitution of the United States to these Proceedings, filed March 6, 1979 (hereinafter "Memorandum in Opposition").
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visualized a hierarchy of types of United States involvement in the governance of overseas territories. For incorporated territories, which are in many
cases territories on their way to full statehood, the full panoply of constitutional rights is applicable. Next, there are those territories, as yet unincorporated, which are guaranteed most or all constitutional safeguards by virtue
of an act of Congress. Then, there are unincorporated territories governed by
the doctrine set forth in King v. Morton,'0" where the constitutionality of
congressional failure to extend the provisions of the Bill of Rights is determined on the basis of a factual inquiry into the feasibility of applying the Bill
of Rights at least as to American citizens. In all of these territories, the prosecution argued, the United States asserts sovereignty.' 0 '
The last in the hierarchy of types of United States governing authority
overseas is United States occupation and control pursuant to conquest, the
prosecution's brief continues: "In such a situation international law prescribes the limits of the occupant's power."' 02 Occupation does not displace
the sovereignty of the occupied state, though for the time being the occupant
may exercise governing authority. Nor does occupation effect any annexation or incorporation of the occupied territory into the territory or political
structure of the occupant, and the occupant's constitution and laws do not
extend of their own force to the occupied territory. It is this sort of authority
the United States exercises in Berlin, the brief concluded. 03
As a corollary to this position the prosecution contended that everything
which concerns the conduct of an occupation is a nonjusticiable political
question. Thus, it stated in its brief:
Berlin is an occupied city. It is not United States territory. The United States presence there grows out of conquest, not the consent of the governed. The United
States, and the other Western Allies have, over time, made political judgments to
turn over to the Berliner's control of important institutions and functions of governance. But these decisions reflect political judgments, not legal necessity.'°'
The prosecution added that the United States Court for Berlin was not an
independent tribunal established to adjudicate the rights of the defendants
and lacked the power to make a ruling contrary to the foreign policy interests
of the United States.
Alternatively, the prosecution argued that the court had the discretion to
deny defendants' motion for a jury trial. It suggested that the court exercise
this discretion for several reasons. First, it contended that a jury would be
inappropriate in an occupation setting because of the historic function of a
jury to oversee governmental authority. Moreover, it contended, laws which
mandate participation by Berlin residents in a jury trial would require an

-00520 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

'"'This portion of the reasoning of the Memorandum in Opposition is quoted at length in
Judge Stern's Opinion, at 20.
1'2d.

"'Memorandum in Opposition, at 28, cited in Judge Stern's Opinion, at 20-21.
"'Quoted id., at 20-21.
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exercise of authority unprecedented in the United States occupation of Germany. Further, implementation of a jury system would require the cooperation of local authorities unfamiliar with the assumptions underlying the jury
system. Finally, the prosecution argued, the United States authorities would
have to consider whether Berliners serving as jurors might be made subject to
pressures, deriving from Berlin's unique political status and geographical
location, which might undermine the conduct of a fair trial.""1
The gravamen of the prosecution's argument, however, was simply that
the court was an instrument of American foreign policy and that, therefore,
any rights to which the defendants might be entitled had to be granted by the
Secretary of State or they did not exist at all:
The basic point is this: a defendant tried in the United States Court for Berlin is
afforded certain rights found in the Constitution, but he receives these rights not by
force of the Constitution itself. . ., but because the Secretary of State has made the
determination that these certain rights should be provided.' 6
Accordingly, the prosecution instructed the court that the Secretary of State
had determined, as a matter of foreign policy, that the right to a jury trial
07
should not be afforded to the defendants.
' 0 Summarized in Judge Sterns Opinion at 21n. As noted below, Judge Stern ruled that the
Constitution did apply to the trial and that it accorded defendants the right to trial by jury in this
case. Following the trial, prior to imposing sentence, Judge Stern described the process by which
the jury had been chosen and what their verdict represented:
THE COURT: " . . . In this case, we have the judgment of the people most close to the situation. The most randomly selected jury of all time, to the best of my knowledge, sat in judgment
on this case... In the United States we try for a completely random selection. To do it, we use
the telephone book, sometimes, in other places they use voting lists. It's well known that not
everybody has a telephone and not everybody registers to vote. In this instance, however, we
used the lists maintained at the local police stations which were a complete index of every
resident in the American Sector of Berlin. And indiscriminately drawn were two thousand
names. And from those two thousand, five hundred more. And from that five hundred were
drawn the jurors who sat in this case. A total and random selection of people who live in the
American Sector of West Berlin. People who have before their eyes constant reminders of the
kind of considerations which prompted this defendant to do what he did, to do what he
admitted to, albeit not precisely the way the government contended he did it.
And it was their ethical judgment that the question was left as to whether or not, given the
motivations which prompted the defendant in this case, he might properly under German law
take the actions which he took. And while it is true, as I told the jury, that their judgment is
predicated and pinned to the precise facts before them, it is nonetheless equally true that ... a
cross-section of the community that resides in West Berlin ... has rendered its judgment that
even under the extraordinary circumstances of this case and with all the reasons which this
defendant had, and even while acquitting him of three of the four counts, nonetheless they
found culpability under the law. And that's why we are here to sentence today, because of the
ethical judgment of a cross-section of this community."
Transcript of Proceedings of May 28, 1979, vol. 17, at 3065-3067, United States v. Tiede, supra.
Prior to his appointment as a district court judge in 1973, Judge Stern had served as an assistant
district attorney in New York City, a trial attorney in the Justice Department's Criminal Division, Assistant United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey, and United States Attor-

ney for that District. See C.

WILLIAMS, BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

352 (976).
"'Memorandum in Opposition, as quoted in Judge Stern's Opinion, at 22A.
""'The conduct of occupation is fundamentally different from the exercise of civil government in the United States. The actions of an occupying power, from necessity, may be inconsis-
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Judge Stern found the prosecution's argument "entirely without
merit."' 08 "First," he said, "there has never been a time when United States
authorities exercised governmental powers in any geographical areawhether at war or in times of peace-without regard for their own Constitution." 09 "Nor," he went on, "has there ever been a case in which constitutional officers, such as the Secretary of State, have exercised the powers of
their office without constitutional limitations."' 0 He then recalled the following principle, as announced by the Supreme Court in Exparte Milligan: '
[The Framers of the American Constitution] foresaw that troublous times would
arise, when rulers and people would become restive under restraint, and seek by
sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed just and proper; and that
the principles of constitutional liberty would be in peril, unless established by irrepealable law. The history of the world had taught them that what was done in the
past might be attempted in the future. The Constitutionof the UnitedStates is a law
for rulers and people, equally in war and peace, and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men, at all times, and under allcircumstances. No doctrine,
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than

that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory
of necessity on which it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as
has been
happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its just author2
ity.'1
"Although the Supreme Court was reviewing the power of military commissions organized by military authorities in the United States during the Civil
War," Judge Stern continued, "the wisdom of the principle set forth above is
nowhere better demonstrated than in this city, during this occupation, and
before this Court."" He concluded thus:
The Prosecution's position, if accepted by this Court, would have dramatic consequences not only for the two defendants whom the United States has chosen to

tent with the wishes or attitudes of the occupied population. In short, the assumptions and values
which underlie the great common law conception of trial by jury do not necessarily have a place
in the conduct of an occupation. Whether it does in a particular situation is quintessentially a
political question, to be determined by the officers responsible for the United States conduct of
the occupation, and not by this Court."
Memorandum in Opposition, at 29, as quoted in Judge Stern's Opinion, at 23.
"'Judge Stern's Opinion, at 23.
'"Id., citing Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
'"Judge Stern's Opinion, at 23.
Even in the long-discredited case of In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), in which American
consular officers were permitted to try United States citizens in certain 'non-Christian' countries, the Court made its decision under the Constitution-not in total disregard of it. The
distinction is subtle but real: the applicability of any provision of the Constitution is itself a
point of constitutional law, to be decided in the last instance by the judiciary, not by the
Executive Branch.
Id.
..71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 120-21.
'"Judge Stern's Opinion, at 24. Emphasis added by Judge Stern.
'3d.
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arraign before the Court, but for every person within the territorial limits of the
United States Sector of Berlin. If the occupation authorities may act free of all
constitutional restraints, no one in the American Sector of Berlin has any protection
from their untrammeled discretion. If there are no constitutional protections, there
is no First Amendment, no Fifth Amendment or Sixth Amendment; even the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude would be inapplicable.
The American authorities, if the Secretary of State so decreed, would have the
power, in time of peace and with respect to German and American citizens alike, to
arrest any person without cause, to hold a person incommunicado, to deny an
accused the benefit of counsel, to try a person summarily and to impose sentenceall as a part of the unreviewable exercise of foreign policy.'
Judge Stern said he did not expect the American occupation authorities to
carry the prosecution's thesis to its logical conclusion. "Nonetheless," he
observed, "people have been deceived before in their assessment of their own

'"Id. at 24-25. In his opinion, Judge Stern recounted at length his verbal exchanges with the
prosecuting attorney over the question of the court's competence to determine the applicability
of the Constitution. Repeatedly, he had asked if the Prosecution's position was as he understood
it to be:
THE COURT: [Mlust [the Court] take the directives of the Secretary of State?
MR. SURENA: The Court cannot go beyond whatever restrictions the Department of State
places upon the Court. That is not to say that the Department of State will affirmatively issue
directives to the Court.
THE COURT: How will I know when you argue to me on the one hand and when you are
telling me on the other?

THE COURT: So that if I understand your position correctly, I have to nothing to decide. I
have only to obey?
MR. SURENA: You have, in our opinion, nothing to decide on the question of a trial by jury.
MR. SURENA: Ultimately it is the position of the United States that the question of the
applicability of the Constitution is not a question to be decided by this Court, except to decide
in agreement with our interpretation that the Constitution does not, of itself, apply in these
proceedings.
THE COURT: Are you standing there telling me you are prosecutor, judge and jury, that you
will make the rules as you wish, change them as you wish, and that all of us must do what you
say?
MR. SURENA: No.
THE COURT: Well, you are going to have to explain to me, Mr. Surena, how you do not have
these powers if you are not in any way bounded by the Constitution of the United States.
MR. SURENA: I think there may be a difference between having those powers and purporting to exercise them.
THE COURT: No, sir. Either you have them or you don't. And if you have them, you may
exercise them at will, unbounded by any restraint. Is that what you are telling me?
MR. SURENA: If we have them, then we can exercise them in proceedings before the United
States Court for Berlin, without restriction by the Constitution.
THE COURT: Is that what you are telling me, that you may do whatever you wish, and
whenever you decide to withdraw your grace, you may do it, at will?
THE COURT: Therefore, you are saying, are you not, that there is no right to due process in
this court?
MR. SURENA: That is correct.
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leaders and their own government; and those who have left the untrammeled,
unchecked power in the hands of their leaders have not had a happy experience. It is a first principle of American life-not only life at home but life
abroad-that everything American public officials do is governed by,
measured against, and must be authorized by the United States Constitution."',
In what ought to have been, but did not prove to be, the last word on the
subject, Judge Stern said that the defendants had the right to due process of
law and that "due process requires that if the United States convenes this
Court, it must come before the Court as a litigant and not as a commander.
The Secretary of State, in establishing a court, appointing a judge, and then
electing to appear before it as a litigant, delegates his powers to the Court.
Thereafter, the United States may, and indeed it should, press strongly for its
views. It may argue them and, if it is so authorized, may appeal from an
adverse decision. It may not, however, compel that its views be victori1
ous.''

6

That it was not the last word became apparant in the evidentiary hearing
preceding the sentencing of defendant Tiede. I In order to induce the defendant to waive trial by jury and plead guilty, the prosecution offered to promulgate (and indeed did promulgate) a new American Sector ordinance to
make anyone convicted of a crime in the American Sector-anyone, not just
Tiede-eligible for parole at the end of one-third of his sentence, rather than

THE COURT: American citizens are subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. Isn't that true?
MR. SURENA: They can be, yes.
THE COURT: Indeed, if the plane which was allegedly hijacked in this case had been hijacked by two Americans, the same procedures, the same proceedings and the same briefs
could have been filed; is that not so?
MR. SURENA: Essentially, yes.
THE COURT: Is there any guarantee that tomorrow you would not summarily arrest somebody off the street in Berlin, hold them liable for crime, and say, for example, also, I think,
from Lewis Carroll, "Sentence first, trial later?" What stops you from that?
MR. SURENA: The history and jurisprudence
THE COURT: Which, I gather, is subservient to

of the Court.

the directions of the Secretary of State. You
told me that, didn't you?
MR. SURENA: Yes.
Transcript of Proceedings of March 13, 1979, vol. 1, at 66-67, 69, 71, 74-75, 83-84, quoted in
Judge Stern's Opinion, at 25-26n.
'"'Judge Stern's Opinion, at 27.
"'Id. Judge Stern said that military cases provide the closest analogy to the situation the case
presented, and he noted that the United States Court of Military Appeals has repeatedly held
that, even though the judge and prosecutor are both appointed by the Executive Branch, the
judge is required to remain impartial, and may not be influenced in his decision by his superiors.
Id., citing, e.g., United States v. Whitley, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 786 (1955) (dismissal of presiding judge
at court-martial proceeding for sustaining objection by defense counsel deprived defendant of a
fair
trial).
'"The charges against Mrs. Ruske were dismissed voluntarily by the prosecution following
Judge Stern's granting of a motion to suppress her pretrial statements.
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at the end of two-thirds as had theretofore been the law.'I Thus, since the
prosecution interpreted the sentencing law as requiring a sentence of three
years for the crime Tiede would plead guilty to, it was offering Tiede eligibility for parole by December 15, 1979."9 The prosecuting attorneys virtually
assured Tiede that they would exercise their discretion as parole authority to
get him released by that date, 2 0 irrespective of whatever views Judge Stern
expressed upon sentencing him, and irrespective, as it happened, of an express requirement in the applicable law that in considering parole the parole
authorities take the sentencing judge's views into account.'" In the event
Judge Stern did not accept the plea bargain arrangement, the Prosecution
was prepared to seek authority to dismiss the case,' 22 in defiance not just of
Judge Stern but of the rules of the court governing plea bargaining, (which
were identical to the plea bargaining provision of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure' 23). As to this final affront, Judge Stern was moved to
observe:
[The prosecutorial authorities] even promised [defendant Tiede] that in the event
this Court had the temerity to say what they were doing was unlawful and unjust
and improper, unethical or whatever this Court might say, they would eradicate

that judgment, too, by simply throwing the entire case out, all to avoid a trial here in
Berlin. 12,

In the end, authority to dismiss the entire matter was not received-in fact,
it was denied, but transmission of the denial was not received in Berlin until
the plea bargaining discussions had terminated with defendant's decision
that he wanted a jury trial.' 2 The trial went to jury, the jury acquitted on
three of the four counts-convicted Tiede, as noted earlier, on a relatively
minor one-and Judge Stern sentenced the defendant to time served.' 26
'"Transcript, vol. 17, at 2796-3041. The language of the ordinance was drafted by the prosecutorial authorities in consultation with defense counsel in the case. Id. at 2983-2984.
"'Id. at 3043 and 3079-3080.
2
' THE COURT: .. .Wasn't the promise that had been made or the offer that had been made
not merely as to the fact that he would be eligible for parole at a certain moment, but that
discretion to parole would be exercised?
MR. SCHUELKE: Yes, sir; assuming there was consideration for the offer.
THE COURT: And the consideration for the offer was the waiver of trial by jury and a plea of
guilty, wasn't it?
MR. SCHUELKE: That's correct.
Henry Schuelke, Esq., Executive Assistant, United States Attorney's Office, District of Columbia, had joined the Prosecution as Assistant United States Attorney for Berlin.
"'Id. at 3040-3042. Aside from other considerations, the Prosecution's plea-bargaining efforts raised the question of whether the government could use its parole authority conditioned on
a waiver by a defendant of his Sixth Amendment rights, i.e., whether it could promise to exercise
a parole authority conditioned on a defendant confessing his guilt in open court and do it all in
advance. Id. at 3032. Judge Stern left no doubt that he felt they could not. Id., at 3076 and 30793080.
'221d. at 3042 and 3079-3080.
"'Le., Rule I l(e). See transcript, vol. 17, at 3076-3079.
"'Id.at 3080. The record indicated that the prosecution was also considering mandamusing
the Judge or, as Judge Stern put it, "anything necessary by way of executive action to achieve
[the result they offered Tiede]." Id.
"'Id. at 3043.
"'Id. at 3089.
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Before sentencing Mr. Tiede, Judge Stern reviewed the criminal proceeding over which he had just presided, calling it the most unusual one in which
he had ever participated.' 27 At the least, his remarks represent an indictment
of the United States authorities in Berlin and the Departments of Justice and
State. They are worth quoting at length:
Very shortly after I was appointed as a Judge of the United States Court for
Berlin, the issue arose as to whether or not this defendant was entitled to the benefits
of the United States Constitution in this courtroom. It was plain that the issue
would arise, because, although the United States was willing to accord this defendant every Constitutional right found within the Constitution, or cases construing it,
it proclaimed that it was not willing to afford this defendant the right to trial by jury.
And even while saying they were prepared to give this defendant every right
found in the Constitution or construed by a United States Court to be a Constitutional right, the United States, here in this court, filed a brief signed by the prosecutorial authorities here, the United States Attorney for Berlin and his assistant. And
that brief said that there are no rights in the United States Court for Berlin except
those rights that the United States chooses to accord in the moment.
Oh, the Court was told that they choose to give Miranda. 2 They choose to give
Escobedo,I29 they choose to give Brady. 110Within limits, they choose to give due

process, but not as a matter of right. No, no. As an act of discretion.
Therefore, I was told, since there are no rights except what the prosecutor is
willing to bestow and since the prosecutor is not willing to bestow the right to trial
byjury, afortiori, there is to be no jury. And the defendant's demand for a jury trial
is to be denied because there is no right-that is to say, something guaranteed by a
Constitution apart from the discretion of the prosecutorial authority-there is no
right to anything at all.
And I was told in oral argument that that included no right to due process of law.
And I was told in oral argument that that meant there was not only no right to due
process in this courtroom, but there was no right to due process in Berlin at all. That
is to say, it wasn't just Tiede standing before this Court who had no rights, but that
because this Court sat in occupied territory, no one had any rights in this Court or
anywhere else within this jurisdiction save those rights accorded by act of grace, by
act of discretion.
The Court was surprised. And, of course, it ruled that such a thing was an impossibility in all courts in which this flag, over my right shoulder, stood. And this Court
said then and it says now that anybody proclaiming such a doctrine in this Court,
who purports to speak for the United States of America, had better check his
authority, because if the public, the people, the citizens of the United States of
America ever really find out that their representatives say that-in Berlin or elsewhere-that where the United States exercises control over the destiny of anyone
else by act of sovereignty, human beings enjoy no rights whatsoever-if the American people ever find that out, these representatives will find out that they represent
nothing but themselves.
It seems to the Court that counsel, the United States Attorney, said it was so; that

"'Id.at 3064.

"'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
"'Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1965).
" Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
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the doctrine that no one had any rights springing from the fact that this was occupied territory applied [to] all of the Constitutional guarantees. First Amendment,
Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment; all of them. Everywhere. Because, we were
told, we are protecting this area and preserving it for democracy."'

Recalling that the defendants had been held in custody for nearly two and a
half months, with mail censored, without phone calls other than with permission-and as to Mrs. Ruske and her daughter without even a case against
them-Judge Stern, a former United States Attorney himself' said:
It would be unthinkable in the United States or in any area governed in any way by
the United States, at least in any such area where there was an independent judiciary, that such conduct would be not only permissible but even contemplated.' 33

The reasons why it was contemplated became clear during the course not only
of Tiede but of that of another case filed with the court. "It was," Judge
Stern said, "because the authorities simply did not recognize that they were
accountable here to anything other than themselves. Not to a Constitution
' 34
and not to a Court." 1
As the Tiede case reached the sentencing stage, the Court received an unexpected application in a civil action, Dostal v. Benedict, 131 in which a resident
of the American Sector in Berlin sought a preliminary injunction against the
construction of a building project being erected there for dependents of
United States Army personnel in Berlin. It appears from the necessarily abbreviated record in the case that the suit had first been filed with a Berlin
administrative court, then in effect withdrawn from that court upon the discretion of the American Military Commander for Berlin-pursuant to occupation law-and then filed by plaintiff's Washington counsel in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. When that court ruled that
the case was strictly a matter affecting German interests, and therefore, that
it had no jurisdiction in the matter, 36 plaintiff sought relief in the United
States Court for Berlin. Whether that court had jurisdiction in the matter
appeared to turn on construction of language in its constitutive statute, according to which its jurisdiction extends to any case "removed, deferred or
transferred" to it from a German court. The precise question was whether

"'Transcript, vol. 17, at 3068-3070.
"See note 105, supra.
"'Transcript, vol. 17, at 3073.
"'Id.at 3074. Later, he added:
What is at stake here is not merely the sentencing of one human being, although that is a very
important thing. What is at stake here is the principle that [is] all we have between us and total
anarchy-I say a kind of anarchy when it was conducted by those in official power, who
recognize nothing but their own discretion. Why have a court if you are not bound by the rules
of Court? What is a judge if he is something that you can tell what to do? Is this a charade, all
of it, for your convenience, to have a forum so you can satisfy your international treaties on
the one hand, but not your Constitution on the other? Here in this city do we have to have
more judges who follow orders?
Id. at 3086.
"'United States Court for Berlin, Civil No. 79-1 (1979).
"'Transcript of Proceedings of May 28, 1979, in Dostal v. Benedict, vol. 2, at 30 et seq.
"Id., at 32.
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the instant case had been removed or transferred to it by virtue of the Army
Commander's directive to the Berlin administrative court.",
The U.S. government-now the defendant-filed a memorandum with
Judge Stern arguing he had no jurisdiction. But that was academic, because
at the same time Ambassador Stoessel sent Judge Stern a letter telling him he
had no jurisdiction. Recalling his exchanges with the Prosecution in the Tiede
case, and his ruling and explicit references to the nature of a court of law's
authority therein, Judge Stern asked the attorney for the defense' 39 whether
Ambassador Stoessel was advising him-Judge Stern-or ordering him in
the instant suit. Counsel replied:
[W]e are not interpreting this letter as a determination on the merits . . .[T]he

Ambassador and others take this case with utmost seriousness and concern, because
of its potential foreign policy impact. If this case were not so important, perhaps
those individuals might have had more confidence in the effectiveness of our advocacy, in terms of a favorable result. Because of the importance of this matter, it was
deemed appropriate to clarify your Honor's jurisdiction and to indicate that this
court is without jurisdiction over that matter." '
He then added that Judge Stern had no discretion to consider the question of
his jurisdiction; that he could grant an oral motion to dismiss, refuse to
accept plaintiff's complaint, or simply rule that his authority had been confined by the ambassador's letter and that he had no alternative but to decline
plaintiff's application. Or he could resign.""
As to the importance of the disposition of the suit to American foreign
policy, Judge Stern responded, in part, as follows:
I have never heard an attorney for the United States tell me the case wasn't
important to his client. And I have never heard [of] a judge worth his salt that would
decide a case simply because it was important to [counsel's] client, even if that client
were the United States. And what you people have to decide is what kind of a court
you [have] here, what kind of court you want here. Are you content to have me
decide the issue as a judge, free and able to decide it against you, or do you want to
give me an order? That is not for me to decide, in the first instance. It's for you to
decide. I'll decide whether
I'll accept your order or not, but you must be very clear
2
in what you are doing."1

After recessing to sentence Mr. Tiede," 3 Judge Stern returned to the courtroom and commented on the position taken by the government's counsel on
the question of Judge Stern's competence to decide the jurisdictional issue:
Now, I have a big problem. I had my hands full today. My problem, basically, is
that I don't want my good judgment to go askew because of the natural ...repulsion that I think any judge would feel upon receipt of a letter of direction on how to
decide a controversy before him, whatever that controversy was, however meritori-

passim.
"'Peter R. Steenland, an attorney with the United States Department of Justice, appeared as a
Special Assistant United States Attorney for Berlin.
"'Transcript of Proceedings of May 28, 1979 in Dostal v. Benedict, vol. 2, at 53.
'"Id., at 85.
'I3ld.,

"'Id., at 61-62.

"'d.,at 78.
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ous it was. Whether about jurisdiction or anything else. And irrespective of how
important it might be to the litigant or the lawyer arguing it. I've never heard of such
a thing. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the action that was taken last night
and the proclamation made by counsel today, are unparalleled in the jurisprudence
[of] the United States of America.
I mean, unparalleled in the jurisprudence of the United States of America for a
litigant to come into court against the United States in the United States courtroom
and for the United States, to order the judge to render a certain decision. Absolutely
incredible. And then, mind you, to say there is due process. . .What am I to do?
What is a judge to do when he gets a letter of direction like that? And I understand,
very well, why this case is so important, as you said, because if there is any possibility that your adversary is right, . . . [that] whenever you forbid a German court to
decide a case between a German and a German, that means that a Major General in
the United States Army can't suddenly issue an order to a German court to stop
adjudicating a controversy before it, without judicial review somewhere. And I can
appreciate what a terrible thing that would be. The trouble is, there are grave problems in construing Law 46, the way in which the plaintiff here has asked me to do it.
But, the gravest problem I face is. . .how I can render any decision whatever that
will have any credence or credibility in the face of a raw exercise of a power unparalleled, in my judgment, in the annals of American jurisprudence in any court I've
ever heard of, Article I, II or II.144
When counsel for the government reiterated how important the court's decision would be and how troublesome it could be to the United States, its allies,
the Berliners and the Federal Republic of Germany, Judge Stern countered:
When was it that Judges were supposed to worry about that in deciding what the
law is? When was it permissible under the oath you took as an attorney, and a
member of the Bar, for Judges to care about that in construing the rights of human
beings? And when did it become permissible for lawyers in a courtroom or a litigant
to tell the Judge that the piece of litigation is so important to the litigant that the
Judge is ordered to find a certain way? What system of justice are you referring to?
What jurisprudence were you trained in that you should make such references?
What court do you know of in the whole American [legal system] that functions this
way? What Judge would do it for you?
We are never allowed to listen to that. We are not permitted to hear that. That's a
vile thing for a Judge to listen to. He can't be a Judge if he listens to that.
Human beings can be adjudged guilty if it is important enough to the state, guilty
or not, as long as it is important enough to the state or to the allies of the state or to
the community of the world. When can it become permissible for Judges to consider
that? Oh, you might say, "Well, he's waving a flag." These moments get crossed
for us in our lives when they are presented to us. And, if I'm flying a flag, I know
whose flag I'm waving.
Any time a Judge decides a case on that basis, he dishonors himself. Not in my
judgment does he commit a wrong against the litigants before him. He commits the
greatest wrong against himself. A Judge who decides a case on that basis, in my
opinion, has no right to be a Judge to begin with. . . [H]e acts, in my view, in utter
disregard of all the applicable Canons of Judicial Ethics that I've ever heard
about.' 5

'4Id., at 80-81.
"'Id., at 86-88.
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Eliciting from counsel the information that counsel had consulted with Ambassador Stoessel and spoke for him, Judge Stern declined to rule so long as
1
the ambassador's letter was pending before the court. "
The following day, May 29, the United States Court for Berlin convened to
hear the Clerk of the Court say that at seven o'clock that morning Judge
Stern had received a letter hand delivered to him in his hotel room.' 7 The
letter was from Ambassador Stoessel and read, in its entirety, as follows:
Dear Judge Stern:
I have been informed that the defendant in UnitedStates as United States Element,
Allied Kommandatura, Berlin v. Tiede has been sentenced and that the criminal
proceeding for which the United States Court for Berlin was convened has thus
been concluded.
Accordingly, as Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission in Germany, acting
pursuant to Article 2(5) of U.S. High Commissioner Law No. 46, I hereby termi-

nate your appointment as a judge of the United States Court of Berlin, effective
May 28, 1979.
Sincerely,
WALTER J.

STOESSEL, JR.

Ambassador"'
Judge Stern was not present in the courtroom for the reading of the letter.
Four months later, the Dostal case was before the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia. There, Judge Barrington D. Parker dismissed the action on the basis of the political question doctrine. Resolution of
the suit, he said, would require an "initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion," one which "would necessarily express
'lack of respect due coordinate branches of government.' "'49 "It is clear
that the decision of the Allied Kommandatura refusing to consent to the
jurisdiction of the German court and the decision of the Ambassador of the
United States refusing to transfer the case to the United States Court for
Berlin represent executive decisions relating to foreign policy.'''"
Concluding Thoughts
The political question defense, turned into a command in the proceedings
in Berlin, has become a staple of government pleading, a standard piece of its
argument whenever governmental or administrative or political expediency
counsels against judicial review of an otherwise quintessentially justiciable
dispute.'' That all this proceeds in consequence of a judicial assertion of the
dictates of the principle of separation of powers seems especially odd. The
time may have come for the courts to rethink the implications which the
political question doctrine holds for constitutional government-and for the
place of international law in the American judicial process.
""Id.,at 91.
"Transcript of Proceedings of May 29, 1979 in United States v. Tiede, vol. 18, at 3091.

"'Id., filed as an attachment.
"'Dostal v. Vance, DKT. No. 79-1964 (9.29.79).

13I1d .
"'See, e.g., Narenji v. Civiletti, No. 79-2640 (D.C.Cir., December 27, 1979); and Hopson v.
Kreps, 462 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Alaska 1979). Cf. Liang Ren-Guevy v. Lake Placid 1980 Olympic
Games, Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 771 (Court of Appeals, February 12, 1980) (per curiam).

